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JURISDICTION 
The Court has jurisdiction of this case under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (4) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether plaintiff waived his objection to Jury-
Instruction No. 19. 
2. If plaintiff did not waive his objection, whether the 
trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 19. 
3. If the trial erred in giving Jury Instruction No. 19, 
whether that error was harmless. 
4. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
awarding as cost an appearance fee that defendant was required 
to pay plaintiff's expert for his deposition. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. In order to preserve an objection to a jury 
instruction, "a party must object with specificity at trial." 
Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Company, 704 P.2d 573, 579 
(Utah 1985). 
2. Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation. 862 P.2d 1342, 
1346 (Utah 1993). 
3. An error in a jury instruction, even when properly 
preserved and presented on appeal, is considered harmless when 
"there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the 
outcome of the proceedings." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 
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(Utah 198 9). An error which is not properly preserved cannot be 
considered on appeal unless it is "obvious.11 JEd. at 121. 
4. Cost awards are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah App. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The jury found both plaintiff and defendant negligent. (RR. 
180-81) The jury found that plaintiff's negligence exceeded 
defendant's (60/40) and on that basis ruled in defendant's 
favor. (R. 181) 
Plaintiff is not arguing that the verdict is against the 
weight of the evidence. Plaintiff is complaining about one of 
the jury instructions given by the trial court. A factual 
statement would be helpful in evaluating that instruction. The 
facts stated in the light most favorable to the verdict are as 
follows: 
1. The accident happened on the day after Christmas, 1990. 
(R. 292) 
2. Plaintiff was driving a fuel tanker for Sunburst 
Transport. (R. 273) 
3. Plaintiff slipped and fell on ice that had formed on 
the floor of the outdoor fuel loading bay owned and operated by 
defendant. (RR. 291, 292, 297) 
4. Plaintiff knew the floor was slippery that day, but did 
not stop work. (RR. 291, 292, 297) 
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5. Plaintiff slipped and hurt himself while trying to 
force the fuel loading arm on the valve farthest from the pump. 
(RR. 277, 278, 290) 
6. Plaintiff did not report his incident to defendant. 
(RR. 279, 332) 
7. Defendant recognized that ice would occasionally form 
on the floor of the outdoor loading bay. (R. 334) 
8. Defendant knew this was an area that needed to be 
salted in the winter. (R. 338) 
9. Defendant knew that on occasion the area had to be 
hand-salted. (R. 339) 
10. Defendant knew that on occasion the area had to be re-
salted later in the same day. (R. 33 9) 
11. It was the habit of the gentleman who was on duty the 
day of the accident (Paul Hatch) to supply the drivers with rock 
salt and a shovel so they could clear ice if they found it on 
the floor of the loading bay. (RR. 334, 335) 
12. Mr. Hatch would have eliminated any dangerous or 
hazardous condition reported to or observed by him. (R. 33 7) 
13. It was the habit of Mr. Hatch to perform a metering 
function on each of the pumps before opening for the day. (R. 
327) 
14. To do this, he had to stand directly in front of the 
pumps in the same place where the drivers stood to load fuel. 
(RR. 327-28) 
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15. Mr. Hatch would have remembered if there had been 
dangerously slick conditions on the floor of the loading bay on 
the day in question. (R. 337) 
16. Though there were other drivers in the same area as 
plaintiff that day, none of them reported an incident. (RR. 337, 
348) 
17. Defendant made an attempt to roughen the surface of 
the loading bay floor to improve its traction. (RR. 344, 34 9) 
18 Defendant considered but did not employ metal grates to 
improve traction. (RR. 342-43) 
The trial court refused the jury instructions requested 
both by plaintiff and defendant on premises liability. (R. 354) 
Defendant requested an instruction that required plaintiff to 
prove defendant had "notice" of the hazardous condition 
complained of. (R. 46) The trial court rejected defendant's 
instruction because, as the trial court concluded, "this is one 
of those cases where the hazard essentially has been created by 
the owner, if in fact one has been created, and therefore he has 
notice of that and that's not required." (R. 354, lines 3-11) 
Plaintiff requested an instruction doing away with the 
"notice" requirement. (RR. 352-53) The trial court considered 
plaintiff's instruction to be unnecessary since he was not 
giving a notice instruction. (R. 354, lines 18-20) In fact, the 
trial court determined that Instruction No. 19 (R. 108) went 
further than the instruction requested by plaintiff because "it 
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says 11 , \..^ defect, then you have to 
post nou.r. \R. jb4 ..:,-:-> 18) 
Once informed of '.: . ^  r'aintiff ""ad-- ^  ~ -:--^  
Instruct!~ x*~ L-^inesb .:;v::ee" 
c l i s t - n c t - . o . . ^ _ . e a b o n s n e a * . ~l The t r i a l c o u r t 
i n v i t - d ~ a m t i f f : o sncw a u t h o r i f y or * r<=> i ^ b i e c t iK l r hut 
a f t e r a r ^ i e f ~-^--*' . j Lutind n o t h i n g . 
( * nt-.fi .^ad-E; no further objection to 
Instruction Nc . * r -5 0) 
VMKAR i ^ ^  Ait JUM^ l'* IS 
..ived his objection to Instruction No. 19. 
2. -;nce • n- - -; .' • ;;* :;• -ot instruct on "notice," a 
Canf ield instruct ir- war unneces^ 
- _um^,^u instruction made no 
Gilrerence :n :::is case oecause -he ju*y found for plaintiff on 
his negligence l^aini aaai^s*" d°f ^ "^li't . 
. a is ere tier, to award as 
costs rees defendant was required to pa(: plaintiff's expert for 
his deposition. 
.ARGUMENTS 
PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS OBJECTION TO ' 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19. 
n** plaintiff requested a:: instruction based 
on Ci.iiield v. Albertsons, Inc., - \ id 12 24 (Utah *.rr " ~*) . 
However, plaintiff dropred - •. . . jquest 
1In any event, plaint ill has dropped this point on appeal. 
Page 8 , n.1. 
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once the trial court informed him there would be no need for it. 
It was incumbent on plaintiff to repeat his request, given the 
trial court's explanation, if in fact he thought a Canfield 
instruction was still necessary. Plaintiff never gave the trial 
court an opportunity to consider the argument he raises here. 
This is fatal to his appeal. 
As is customary, the trial court distributed a set of jury 
instructions prior to the jury instruction conference with 
counsel. He started by eliciting exceptions to instructions he 
planned to give. (R. 352, lines 7-8) Plaintiff immediately 
turned to Instruction No. 19. (R. 352, lines 14-15) His 
exception was to the phrase "business invitee," a distinction 
which he said had been "abolished in Utah by higher courts." (R. 
352, lines 17-21) He argued that a "comparative standard" of 
negligence should be used instead. (R. 352, lines 21-22) He 
went on to say that actual knowledge of a dangerous condition is 
not necessary "where expectable acts of third parties would 
create a dangerous condition,..." (R. 353, lines 2-3) He then 
asked for a Canfield instruction. (R. 353, lines 16-17) 
The trial court responded by stating that he was not going 
to give defendant's instruction, which asked for a notice 
requirement. (R. 354, lines 3-5) He thought this was one of 
those cases "where the hazard essentially has been created by 
the owner, if in fact one has been created, and therefore he has 
notice of that and [notice is] not required." (R. 354, lines 9-
11) Since he was dispensing with the notice requirement, there 
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wa.s no need to Lnsrr,;~~ .*- /e requirement. 
Reascna,. -. ,i,~ m e on^ je^e^ant jnsideraticn, and •: ,:e 
trial :cur deemed his Instruction Mc .9 nor. *:o be 
"essentially . .. different :hr Canf iel.^ as 
[reas^r.a" ' .ncernea. " • k - c 4 . lines 12-14) 
Plaintiff voiced no objection to * ::a foregoing.. He s-*id 
nothing mere about Canf ield c~- abou*- ••"** --- ; . -..-:. 
In far" • :i,.^&eu agreement • . ' r. the substance ::' 
what trie t:.a* court was demg in Instruction No. l? 
THE COURT. . vr.ir.r: :.VJ mstructic.
 LNc. ^j, in-
states the status of the law. I think the old 
distinction is gone, you're right. I think the 
reasonable care standard is the one that's appl-ca; '.-
and that's what makes :i t different from the old 
standard. 
<^JOK: That I accept, your Honor, that . t is the 
*.^usonable care t^-^ n.-iani 1 P l RR , 1 i nes ".;- • 22) 
That was th * - • •-.--. - v : m t i m s to 
• -.?" . :z- .^ . _*, . A/as planning to give 7h~ trial 
court then opened discussicr en _:\siruc- r^.s b-= * ?, - " ~"~ rlar.-
*• „ give, tr.ougn requested ~- *-h~ . ..;) 
Pi a Lr-' *"'" ' . _ ~-_ «_ nio Canfieid instruction ::: 
*_ ..c^ -.^ .- requirement. , R. 3 5S' . * is clear from -he forecom: 
he had ampl~ opportunity m do so thxc 
instruction confprenre, 
2Though he did repeat his previous objection that the 
"business invitee distinction has been abolished :n r-:r state 
(R. 3 55, lines 3-4) 
7 -
It goes without saying that "objections [to jury 
instructions] must be made before the instructions are given to 
the jury;..." Rule 51, U.R.C.P. What follows from this is " [n]o 
party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an 
instruction unless he objects thereto." Rule 51. It is obvious 
that plaintiff failed to inform the trial court of the objection 
he raises here. The trial court had no way of knowing that 
plaintiff still wanted a Canfield instruction. Given the nature 
of the discussion, the trial court could safely assume that 
plaintiff had abandoned his request for a Canfield instruction. 
Once the trial court informed plaintiff that since there would 
be no "notice" instruction there was no need for a "Canfield" 
instruction, it was incumbent upon plaintiff to state his 
disagreement so the error, if there was one, could be corrected. 
To preserve an objection on appeal, "a party must object 
with specificity at trial." Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium 
Company, 704 P.2d 573, 579 (Utah 1985). "An objection to an 
instruction must be sufficiently precise to alert the trial 
court to all claimed error and to give the judge an opportunity 
to make any corrections deemed necessary." Pioneer Valley 
Hospital. 830 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah 1992). The purpose for this 
rule is obvious: "When the trial judge has such notice, he or 
she is able to correct an error before the jury retires." Id. 
(citing Beehive Medical Electronics, Inc. v. Square D Company, 
669 P.2d 859, 860-61 (Utah 1983)). The error that plaintiff 
complains about is one that could have been raised before the 
- 8 -
jury retired. It appears fro™ -~- re""vi *----.• - , _-.-_ no 
cbiecti7!~ ' "=' " :,.i: t^an :: ^se cf -he term 
11
 bujiness .:v;::ee. ". .ie ::r:a: ••JJUI*. was never given an 
opportunity to consider what plaintiff raises '"~v -* in 
-h^ abser." ~* * 'ury 5:.c,i^ .a ce 
...-.:"u;:-. . .^: ..-/uice .^s excused ::: : * ?es where the property 
owner created the hazardous conditio i ~:'c v-" ^ - n h < ' a 
practical c':r^ :S'* ' .^ ...T .:: *eie 
-. * * J_ O t^- w i. i . *. 
In certain cases, Rule 51 allows *~ ie aooellat- -% 
th€B exercise ^f d"i"r~^: - * . - : :.^: ^ only 
vr-v -v^^us" an.- if "sufficient 
magnitude ma-. affects the substantial rights of a car.- " 
State v. Verde, inr> ?..-**' ~ "^ "• - - ^roc-KSton 
v, r „r~ .i.ouiauve ^A^i.d. .i -c - v99 /Jtah 19 91) land 
applied to Rule 51, ".? -,?. -"uffice it tc say tha* - all 
such cases, !. t is incumbent uccr. -u- ! - *~ resent 
a persujs --"-• . .^ t discretion, .ana this 
L'equii'es showing specxai circumstances warranting such a 
review." Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchanae. °"" 
(quoting Hansen v. Stewa. . • -.. .:.,• ~ r~ 
has been ..J:: showing hei-r, \- plaintirr's waiver cannot be 
excused. 
'Both of these issues are address^a • i IOIVJ 1 1, and III 
below. 
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II. SINCE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT INSTRUCT ON 
"NOTICE," A CANFIELD INSTRUCTION WAS 
UNNECESSARY. 
Both plaintiff and the trial court agreed that premises 
liability should be stated in terms of reasonable care. This 
appears to be consistent with Utah law on the subject. Dwiggins 
y. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1991) . Instruction 
No. 19 is stated in terms of reasonable care. (R. 108) In this 
appeal, plaintiff is saying that he wanted something in addition 
to what is stated in Instruction No. 19 (a Canfield 
instruction). This dispute centers on what has become known as 
the "notice" requirement of premises liability. 
Defendant (the landowner) requested an instruction based on 
Martin v. Safewav Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977), 
requiring plaintiff to prove that defendant "knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that a dangerous 
condition existed,..." Plaintiff countered with an instruction 
based on Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d at 1226, 
dispensing with the notice requirement in cases where the 
"storeowner, its agents, or employees create or are responsible 
for the dangerous condition." The trial court refused to give 
defendant's notice instruction. He viewed this as a case where 
the property owner could not possibly contest notice, since it 
was the one who created the hazardous condition (assuming there 
was one). The trial court's decision not to give the notice 
instruction is not at issue here. 
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Once " ne trial c~ur*" ~ad~- • 
:n^ + ecessary. When u : . c e is satisfied, 
reascnar^e care is the only relevant question in these cases. 
The trial court was entirely c c r r e " ~~r 
notice rec . * ^  ^ -^^ _atc. ,..c s-iv. and 
substance r •_.*- 5^,. nstruction requested by plaintiff, 
which is reasonable care. This is made clear f^ * *-=> Canf ield 
decision 5 ^=-1 *" 
n.;.-.j.o;:4s attempted to defend by arguing that :t had no 
notice of the specific lettuce leaf up-^ w h i ^ riair.^if* -r-i 
and fel nfield , . .^ : ^ - o i > .1.. 
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FAILURE TO GIVE A CANFIELD INSTRUCTION MADE 
NO DIFFERENCE IN THIS CASE SINCE THE JURY 
FOUND FOR PLAINTIFF ON HIS NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
The jury was never told that "notice" was an issue, 
Therefore, :- was total!1, Mf'.pcpp^flr, II "1 1, , ,< an 
i list i" ii" 1 u'licc: was not an .sbti. . r notice had been 
an issue, defendant might have escaped liability because of lack 
of notice. The fact that defendant was found liable signifies 
that whatever error was made in Instruction No. 19 was perfectly 
harmless. 
Although the Court of Appeals was reversed the last time it 
applied this logic, the facts in that case were different from 
those here. In Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corporation, 
862 P.2d 1342, 1346 (Utah 1993), the Court of Appeals reasoned 
that an error in an instruction on negligence was overcome by 
the jury's verdict, in plaintiff's favor, on negligence. The 
Supreme Court, however, concluded that the error in the 
instruction also went to proximate cause, and since the jury 
found against plaintiff on proximate cause, it could not be said 
the error was harmless (though the Supreme Court affirmed the 
Court of Appeals for other reasons). 862 P.2d at 1346. The 
Court of Appeals does not have the same problem here. The jury 
found defendant liable, which means it answered both the 
negligence and proximate cause questions in plaintiff's favor. 
Plaintiff argues (in his brief) that the jury might have 
been persuaded by arguments that plaintiff did not report the 
incident. (Page 12) Plaintiff has read these arguments 
completely out of context. They were permissible for two very 
important reasons. First, there was a question as to whether 
there was a hazardous condition in the loading bay on the day in 
question. There was substantial evidence that other drivers 
worked in that same spot and had no problems that day. (RR. 337, 
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348) Defendant was entitled to suggest that plaintiff's failure 
to report the incident bore on whether a hazardous condition 
existed: "You would think if there had been a big problem, 
[plaintiff] would have told us, even after the fact." (R. 368, 
lines 15-17) Second, contributory negligence was definitely an 
issue in the case. Defendant used the fact that plaintiff 
failed to report the incident as an indication of contributory 
negligence: "If it was slippery, you should have stopped what 
you are doing. You don't have to move your truck, that's fine, 
but go get some help. Go tell somebody that there is a problem. 
That's what Paul's job is to do. It would have been the 
simplest thing in the world to do this. Go tell him." (R. 370, 
lines 15-20) 
Defendant did not argue for dismissal based on lack of 
notice. The arguments that were made were perfectly appropriate 
for the issues that were legitimately in the case. In any 
event, plaintiff failed to object to the arguments, so this 
issue cannot be considered here. The jury was not confused. 
Notice was not an issue in the case. The trial court was 
entirely correct in the way it instructed the jury on this 
important point. 
IV. IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION 
TO AWARD AS COSTS FEES DEFENDANT WAS 
REQUIRED TO PAY PLAINTIFF'S EXPERT WITNESS. 
Plaintiff reads the provision for costs too narrowly. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) states that costs 
are "generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner 
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provided by statute." 605 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added). The 
decision goes on to say: "Subject to the limitation expressed 
above, this Court has taken the position that the trial court 
can exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the allowance of 
costs;..." id. at 773-74 (emphasis added). Morgan v. Morgan, 
795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990) is also read too narrowly: 
"Witness compensation in excess of the statutory schedule is 
generally inappropriate as a cost." 795 P.2d at 687 (emphasis 
added). 
What is significant is that Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
54(d)(1) is considered to be the "basic statutory provision" 
when it comes to awarding costs. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d at 
773 (emphasis added). Defendant's claim for the $300 appearance 
fee to Dr. Paulos is based another Utah Rule of Civil Procedure, 
26(b)(4)(C)(i): "Unless manifest injustice would result, the 
court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the 
expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to 
discovery under Subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this 
rule;..." Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) governs "discovery by other 
means," which includes depositions. In other words, defendant 
was required by Rule 26 to pay Dr. Paulos a fee for attending 
his deposition. It is difficult to see how the trial court 
abused his discretion in awarding this as cost. 
There is an important distinction between this and the two 
cases cited by plaintiff. The Courts in those cases denied as 
costs expenses associated with the expert witnesses of the 
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prevailing parties. That would be like defendant trying to 
recover the expenses associated with its own expert witnesses, 
assuming it had expert witnesses. Neither Court had to deal 
with the situation presented here, where the prevailing party 
had to pay a fee to the expert witness of the other party in 
order to take that witness' deposition. It is important to note 
that plaintiff "does not contest whether the deposition was 
taken in good faith or essential for the development and 
presentation of the case." (Pages 13-14) Plaintiff offers no 
good reason why defendant should not recover all expenses 
necessarily incident to the deposition he agrees was necessary 
for the development and presentation of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has waived his objection to Instruction No. 19. 
His objection is not well taken because notice was not an issue 
in this case. Since plaintiff prevailed on his negligence claim 
against defendant, it is clear whatever error was done was 
harmless. The trial court was well within his discretion when 
it awarded plaintiff's expert witness fee as cost. 
Respectfully submitted this of August, 1994. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-333 3 
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I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct 
copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLE to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this (2.^ay of August, 1994, to the 
following: 
Glen A. Cook 
Cook & Lawrence, L. L. C, 
4001 South 700 East, Suite 240 
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